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USING BORDER TRADE ADJUSTMENTS TO
ADDRESS LABOR RIGHTS CONCERNS UNDER
THE WTO
MICAH GLOBERSON*
Prior to his passing in October 2011, Apple CEO and founder Steve Jobs
delivered a speech at a February 2011 dinner event attended by major
executives throughout Silicon Valley, as well as U.S. President Barack
Obama.1 President Obama interrupted Mr. Jobs’ speech to ask what it
would take to get Apple, a company that once prided itself on making its
products in America but came to do nearly all of its manufacturing
overseas, to make iPhones in the United States.2 Mr. Jobs was said to have
replied that “[t]hose jobs aren’t coming back.”3 A New York Times article
wrote of Mr. Jobs’ response that:
It isn’t just that workers are cheaper abroad. Rather, Apple’s
executives believe the vast scale of overseas factories as well as
the flexibility, diligence and industrial skills of foreign workers
have so outpaced their American counterparts that “Made in the
U.S.A.” is no longer a viable option for most Apple products.4
*
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1
Charles Duhigg & Keith Bradsher, How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/business/apple-americaand-a-squeezed-middle-class.html?pagewanted=all.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
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But at the same time, it was becoming apparent to the international
public that Apple’s incredible productivity in China came at a price. Apple
in 2007 audited working conditions at the Shenzhen facility of Foxconn, a
Taiwan-based company that was the world’s biggest manufacturer of
electronics and Apple’s main manufacturing partner.5 The prior June,
almost a dozen Foxconn employees committed suicide not long after Apple
increased orders in a race to meet demand for the popular iPad tablet
device.6 Apple’s review of the Foxconn facilities revealed underage
workers, indentured servitude conditions, and other human rights
problems.7 The controversy over workers’ conditions at Foxconn is only
more heated today, with whistleblowers coming forward to tell their stories
about horrific working conditions, unreasonable hours, and other
grievances.8
Apple and Foxconn have been singled out for public criticism not
because their practices are unique; on the contrary, Foxconn’s labor
conditions might be superior to local market standards.9 Rather, the fact
that many Americans own and daily use Apple’s iconic products like the
iPad and iPhone, and that they associate the products with personal status,
make some consumers feel personally responsible for contributing to the
unfair exploitation of other human beings.10 Moreover, because Apple is a
leader, innovator, and model (particularly with respect to its supply chain),
its efforts to quell public pressure by demanding better practices from
5
Ian Sherr, Apple Says China Partner Made Changes For Workers, WALL ST. J.,
Feb.
15,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487035848045761446424619
17766.html.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See, e.g., Sui-Lee Wee, Insight: Young Chinese Workers Seek End to “Eating
Bitterness”, REUTERS, Apr. 6, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/06/uschina-worker-idUSBRE83504T20120406.
9
See, e.g., Foxconn Working Conditions 2012: Company Cuts Hours, Employees
Ask
Why,
REUTERS,
Mar.
30,
2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/30/foxconn-working-conditions-2012hours_n_1390541.html. See generally Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Accountability
Standards in the Global Supply Chain: Resistance, Reconsideration, and Resolution in
China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 321, 333 (2007) (discussing human rights
problems caused by the global supply chain and proposing solutions through corporate
social responsibility).
10
Cf., Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs are Built into an
iPad, NY TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/
business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html (noting
that Apple’s very enthusiastic consumer base can be a force that pressures it to improve
labor conditions, as other consumers did for Nike and Gap).
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Foxconn may to some degree serve to improve working conditions across
China.11
But what if the public shaming of Apple and Foxconn does not lead to
significant change across the industry? And what if Americans
subsequently insist that their elected representatives no longer allow
imports of products made by children, by people not paid a living wage, by
indentured laborers, by people working sixty hour weeks for eleven days in
a row, or by others working under indecent labor conditions?12 This paper
examines how, under the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), a country
like the U.S. might attempt to use trade measures to force the hand of
another country with respect to workers’ rights.
The paper begins by explaining why most restrictions on trade intended
specifically to militate in of favor labor rights would be found
discriminatory under the WTO. It first focuses in detail on the sections of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) likely to make a
labor-rights related trade measure discriminatory, particularly the
requirements for most favored nation treatment and national treatment.
The paper then looks at exceptions under the GATT General Exceptions
Clause that may justify and excuse a discriminatory measure promoting
labor rights, and how such a measure would need to be crafted under the
Clause’s chapeau. In doing so, this paper points out the critical unanswered
questions in current jurisprudence that are central to determining whether a
discriminatory trade measure justified by a labor rights purpose would
receive an exception under exceptions (a) or (b) of the General Exceptions
Clause.13
I.WHAT MIGHT A LABOR-RIGHTS-SUPPORTING
TRADE MEASURE LOOK LIKE?
The International Labor Organization (“ILO”), created in 1919 by the
Treaty of Versailles, develops internationally agreed-upon standards for
workers’ rights.14 The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
11
Charles Duhigg & Steven Greenhouse, Electronic Giant Vowing Reforms in China
Plants, Mar. 29, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/business/
apple-supplier-in-china-pledges-changes-in-working-conditions.html.
Notably,
in
addition to issues with the working environment itself, China receives substantial
criticism for taking inadequate legislative and enforcement steps to prohibit
employment discrimination. See generally Xun Zeng, Enforcing Equal Employment
Opportunities in China, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 991, 1014-15 (2007).
12
See, e.g., id. (referencing a report citing “numerous instances where Foxconn
defied industry codes of conduct by having employees work more than 60 hours a
week, and sometimes more than 11 days in a row”).
13
See id.
14
See About the ILO: Origins and History, INT’L LABOR ORG. (“ILO”), About the
ILO: Origins and History, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--
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Rights at Work, adopted in 1998 and binding upon ILO member countries,
identifies four main principles: (1) freedom of association and a right to
collective bargaining, (2) elimination of forced labor, (3) abolition of child
labor, and (4) elimination of employment discrimination.15 ILO
recommends a pre-overtime work week of eight hours per day and of
ideally forty, and no more than forty-eight, hours per week, with no more
than twelve hours of weekly overtime.16 In addition to the ILO
Conventions, mainstream human rights treaties, such as the United Nations
International Bill of Human Rights, propose labor standards that all
countries should follow.17
There are many ways in which the U.S. could attempt to draw a line on
what constitutes an abuse of workers’ rights, and various trade measures
that the U.S. could use to respond to such abuses. For example, the U.S.
could use the approach attempted in the Dolphin-Tuna case, by creating a
“no child labor” label and mandating that manufacturing processes meet a
certain standard in order to attain such certification.18 Alternatively, the
U.S. could use any of a number of import-restrictive border adjustment
measures, for example,
• by imposing an outright ban on products of prison labor;19
• by imposing sanctions or quantitative restrictions (including a
partial or complete ban) on products made at below universally
agreed upon international human rights standards (e.g., the ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work or
the International Bill of Human Rights) or the Technical Barriers

en/index.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
15
Declaration Overview: Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, ILO (May 1, 2004), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--declaration/documents/publication/wcms_095898.pdf; see also Marley S. Weiss,
International Labor and Employment Law: From Periphery to Core, 25 ABA J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 487, 495-96 (2010). ILO adopted few conventions from 1985 onward and
became viewed as toothless until 1998, when the Declaration reinvigorated
international labor law “from a period of stagnation and near-futility, to a wildly
pluralistic period of effectiveness.” Id.
16
Q&As on Business and Working Time, ILO (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://www.ilo.org/empent/areas/business-helpdesk/WCMS_DOC_ENT_HLP_TIM_
FAQ_EN/lang--en/index.htm.
17
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/;
Michael J. Treblicock & Robert Howse, Trade Policy & Labor Standards, 14 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 261, 261-62 (2005) (explaining that the Treaty of Versailles established
the ILO).
18
See Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT D/S21/R
(Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter “Tuna/Dolphin I”].
19
See infra note 107 (discussing Turkey-Textiles case).
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to Trade (“TBT”) Agreement;20
by taxing products produced by workers earning below a certain
wage or working more than a certain number of hours per week;
by increasing tariffs or imposing countervailing duties intended
to offset the cost-savings wrongly attained through unfair labor
practices;21 or
by extending U.S. regulations on wages, hours, etc. to imports.

The challenge for the U.S. will be to design a border adjustment that will
be found either to not discriminate under the WTO rules or, if
discriminatory, to be of such a nature that the U.S. is justified in invoking
one of its specified rights to discriminate under the General Exceptions
Clause.
II. RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE MEASURES
In developing a trade measure, a Member is bound to the schedules
agreed upon at WTO admission, per Article II.22 The Member must also
follow the principle of “most favored nation” (“MFN”) treatment, which
requires that a Member granting a privilege to another Member must
extend the same privilege to all other Members.23 Another central principle
that WTO signatories must obey is that of “national treatment,” which
prohibits countries from taking steps to favor their domestic products over
imports.24
A. GATT Article I – Most Favored Nation Treatment
GATT Article I requires countries to engage in MFN treatment, meaning
that imports from one Member country must be treated on terms no less
favorable than those from another Member. In relevant part, Article I states
that:
any advantage . . . granted by any [WTO Member] to any product
originating in . . . any other country shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined
for the territories of all other [Members].25
20

See infra notes 94-97 (discussing the TBT Agreement).
See infra Section II.
22
See infra Subsection 0 (discussing schedules of concessions).
23
See infra Subsection A.
24
See infra Subsection 0.
25
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS:
21
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The term “like product” is a key operator in the WTO language, raising a
central threshold question of what makes one product “like” another
product. Empirically different products may still be “like products.” For
example, in Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (“Japan–Alcohol”), the
Appellate Body (“AB”) affirmed a GATT Panel decision that vodka and
shochu are “like” products and should be taxed equivalently.26 Under
Article I, “like” products include products that are “remotely similar”
regardless of the context of the application.27 This broad standard includes
“directly competitive or substitutable” products.28 There is substantial
debate, however, regarding whether any competing or substitute products
will be “like,” or whether facts such as the means of production or the
competitive relationship between the products merely play a role in getting
at the main concerns addressed by Article I (favoritism) and the likeworded Article III (protectionism).29
MFN prevents a Member from using sanctions or targeting taxes against
other specific members; for example, a U.S. prohibition on Chinese iPads
would violate MFN treatment. Another option would be to try to argue that
a good on the market that is the product of bad labor standards is not “like”
a competing product made under good labor conditions. However, the
“likeness” standard under Article I is broad and generally treats competing
and substitute goods as “like products,” so cases in which a Member that
treats competing imports (of equal quality) differently solely on the
grounds of how the goods are produced will tend to violate its Article I
obligations.
B. GATT Article II – Schedules of Concessions
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17
(1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter "GATT"].
26
Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R
(Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages].
27
WON-MOG CHOI, “LIKE PRODUCTS” IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: TOWARDS A
CONSISTENT, GATT/WTO JURISPRUDENCE 100-01, (2003). This is because the
applicable language in Article I parallels that of both Article III:2, the “directly
competitive or substitutable” standard, and Article III:4, the (broader) “remotely
similar” standard, which are interpreted in EC–Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter
“Appellate Body Report, EC–Asbestos”]; and Ad Note to GATT Article III:2, second
sentence. Some scholars argue that the standard applies differently depending upon
whether it is a border measure or an internal measure, but Choi rejects this view in the
case of Article I.
28
Id.
29
The discussion of “likeness” continues in Subsection 0 (on National Treatment).
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GATT Members’ schedules of tariff concessions appear either annexed
to the Marrakesh Protocol to the GATT of 1994 or, for later WTO entrants,
annexed to their respective Protocols of Accession.30 Each schedule applies
to a particular tariff, providing specific tariff concessions and other
commitments agreed upon through trade negotiations, and including such
details as a description of the product covered and the rate of duty and
other charges.31 For trade in goods, the schedules include maximum tariff
levels called “bound tariffs” or “bindings.”32
GATT Article II governs tariffs on imports at the border, requiring that
countries abide by their Schedules and do not impose additional duties or
other charges.33 Article II is explicit that it does not pertain to “a charge
equivalent to an internal tax.”34 Such measures are instead governed under
GATT Article III:2 and referred to as “border tax adjustments.”35
C. GATT Article III – National Treatment
GATT Article III permits internal taxes and regulations on both domestic
and imported goods, so long as they do not give favor to domestic products
over imports.36 Article III specifically requires that internal taxes or other
charges should be the same for like products and that “products . . .
imported . . . shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to like products of national origin.”37 As with Article I,
concerning MFN, the “like products” standard does not require that the
products be physically identical but instead focuses on whether they are
competing products or economic substitutes.38 For this reason, it is often
30

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (“WTO”), Current Situation of Schedules of WTO
Members, at Section I, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules
_e/goods_schedules_table_e.htm (last visited April 26, 2012).
31
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO), Goods Schedules: Members’
Commitments,
available
at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm (last visited
April 26, 2012).
32
Id.
33
GATT, art. II(1)(a)-(b).
34
GATT, art. II((2)(a).
35
Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970) at
paras. 7 & 14, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.
pdf [hereinafter Border Tax Adjustment Report].
36
GATT, art. III(1).
37
GATT, art. III(2)&(4).
38
See Choi supra at note 27; Patrick Low, Gabrielle Marceau & Julia Reinaud, Staff
Working Paper, The Interface Between the trade and Climate Change Regimes:
Scoping the Issues 6, WTO ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND STATISTICS DIVISION (Dec.
2011); Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory
Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 249,
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believed that a Member will not be able to claim that two otherwise
indistinguishable products are not “like products” solely on process
grounds, e.g., that one product is made under poor labor standards and the
other is made under internationally acceptable labor standards.
1. Japan–Alcohol
In Japan–Alcohol, the U.S., European Community (“EC”), and Canada
disputed a Japanese liquor tax law that divided various types of alcoholic
beverages into ten categories with sub-categories: sake, sake compound,
shochu, mirin, beer, wine, whisky, spirits, liqueurs, and miscellaneous.39
Different tax rates applied to each category and sub-category defined by the
law.40
The EC argued that “spirits” (vodka, gin, white rum, and genever) are
“like” under the first sentence of Article III:2 and therefore may not be
taxed at different rates or, in the alternative, that the spirits are “directly
competitive and substitutable products” under the second sentence of
Article III:2.41 Canada seized on the same “directly competitive and
substitutable product” language from the second sentence of Article III:2,
arguing that tax differences distort the products’ relative prices, thereby
distorting consumer choice between the products, and ultimately distorting
the products’ competitive relationship.42 The United States argued that the
Japanese tax regime for alcohol was devised to protect shochu production
and, paired with the similarity in their characteristics and end uses, the
brown and white spirits are “like products” per the first sentence of Art.
III:2; alternatively, all distilled spirits are “directly competitive and
substitutable” per the second sentence of Article III:2 for the same
reasons.43 Japan, on the other hand, countered that the purpose of the tax
law was not protectionism, nor did it afford protectionist benefits;
260 (2000) (contrasting vodka and shochu, which are easily distinguishable but
considered “like” products, with two hypothetical chemicals that are structurally
identical except with respect to a single atom but have completely different physical
properties (one is a potent explosive or neurotoxin and the other is harmless) but would
clearly not be considered as “like” products, underscoring the point that “the issue of
‘likeness’ is distinct from the issue of physical similarity, and not even very closely
related. The chemicals are much more physically similar than vodka and shochu, but
they are much less ‘like.’”).
39
Panel Report, Japan–Alcohol ¶ 2.2, WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R & WT/DS11/R (July
11, 1996) [hereinafter “Panel Report, Japan–Alcohol”].
40
Id. ¶ 2.3.
41
Id. ¶ 3.1.
42
Id. ¶ 3.2.
43
Id. ¶ 3.3.
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moreover, the various product categories are not “like” under the first
sentence of Article III:2, nor “directly competitive and substitutable
products” under the second sentence and, consequently, the tax law is valid
within the scope of MFN.44
In its analysis, the AB looked at the first two sentences of Article III:2 in
their respective order. In the first sentence, products are “like,” as
“construed narrowly so as not to condemn measures that its strict terms are
not meant to condemn,” in which case the measure fails if the tax rates are
even minimally different.45 Next, under the second sentence, where
products are not “like” under the narrow definition of the first sentence but
instead “like” under the “substitutable and directly competing” standard,
the measure fails under the “not similarly taxed” standard only if the
difference in tax rates is more than de minimis.46
The AB in Japan–Alcohol upheld the Panel’s finding that shochu and
vodka are “like” under both the first and second sentences of Article III:2,
such that even a minimal difference in taxation is impermissible, thereby
making Japan’s measure impermissible.47 First, the AB surmised whether
the dissimilar taxation was applied ‘“so as to afford protection on domestic
production” on a case-by-case basis by looking at “the design, the
architecture, and the revealing structure of the measure.”48 Whereas the
Panel held that this was established merely by observing that the dissimilar
taxation exceeded a de minimis level and that the spirits were “directly
competitive or substitutable products,” the AB insisted that the level must
go well beyond a de minimis level in order to demonstrate protectionism.49
Rather, the AB found the Panel’s additional findings showing significant
adverse effects on foreign competition were essential in demonstrating that
the measure afforded protectionism.50 Specifically, the AB focused on the
Panel’s findings that Japan’s disputed tax “makes it difficult for foreignproduced shochu to penetrate the Japanese market” and “does not
guarantee equality of competitive conditions between shochu and [other
spirits],” which led the Panel to conclude that “Japan manages to ‘isolate’
domestically produced shochu from foreign competition[.]”51 To the AB,
these additional facts were not extraneous, but instead essential evidence
demonstrating that Japan acted in a protectionist manner.52 The AB then
44

Id. ¶ 3.4.
Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 26, ¶
19-20.
46
Id. ¶ 27.
47
Id. ¶ 32.
48
Id. ¶ 29.
49
Id. ¶¶ 30-31.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
45
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confirmed its decision by noting that it reflected the reasonableness and
flexibility of the WTO rules and that it comported with the “customary
rules of public international law,” a reference to Annex 2 of the WTO
Agreement, known as the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”).53
2. “Least Favored Nation” Treatment
The Japan–Alcohol holding was softened slightly by Korea–Various
Measures on Beef to include “no less favorable” treatment.54 In that case,
the AB held that a Korean regulation established a “dual retail system”
inconsistent with GATT Article III:4.55 Nonetheless, the AB also agreed
with Korea’s argument that Article III:4 only requires that WTO members
“provide equal conditions of competition,” meaning that “differential
treatment” may be acceptable, so long as it is “no less favorable” to foreign
imports than to domestic goods.56 In this regard, differently taxed products
found “like” under the “narrow” reading of the first sentence of Article
III:2, or found “like” as competitors or substitutes under the second
sentence, can in cases of “less favorable treatment” nonetheless be found
acceptable under Article III where the competitive harm is distributed in
such a way as to dispel the appearance of protectionism. The AB in EC –
Asbestos clarified that:
The term “less favorable treatment” expresses the general
principle, in Article III:1, that internal regulations “should not be
applied . . . so as to afford protection to domestic production”57
In other words, the case-by-case likeness analysis requires attention not
only to whether the products have an economically competitive relationship
but to the actual impact that the measure in question has on that
relationship, and whether it should be construed as of a protectionist nature.
53

Id. at 31 (citing Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994), Article
3.2 [hereinafter “DSU”]).
54
Appellate Body Report, Korea–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report
Korea–Beef], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/repertory_e/
index_abreport_kl_e.htm#ds161abr.
55
Id. ¶ 186(e).
56
Id. ¶¶ 16, 137.
57
Appellate Body Report, EC–Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, supra note 27, ¶ 100.
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Indeed, the Panel in EC – Biotech Products confirmed this approach when
it held that an EC regulation on genetically-modified organisms (GMOs)
was not “less favorable” to imports because it treated both imported and
domestic GMOs and non-GMOs the same way, and the disparate effect of
the regulation was in fact a direct consequence of subjective government
and consumer perceptions.58 Where a labor-rights-supporting trade measure
is extended by a Member country to apply to domestic and imported
products alike, and it would otherwise violate MFN treatment, a defense
might be to show that the treatment is no less favorable to foreign products
than to domestic products. That the WTO permits the “least favored
nation” defense to a dispute over dissimilar treatment of otherwise “like”
products strongly suggests that it is not the physical makeup of the
products, or their competitive relationship, but instead the rejection of
protectionism that is the overriding concern at the heart of the likeness
analysis.
3. Production and Process Methods (PPMs)
Suppose you encounter two shirts in the marketplace that are physically
indistinguishable. You learn that one was made by an Italian tailor working
40 hours a week for a reasonable wage, whereas the other was made in a
sweatshop in rural China. Can the WTO distinguish the two products as not
“like,” and thereby allow member states to treat these imports differently,
when they are not only economic substitutes but physically
indistinguishable? In other words, can a “likeness” distinction depend
solely on the method by which a product is manufactured, or must two
products at a minimum present a chemical, structural, or other physical
difference (however subtle) before the WTO can consider them not “like”?
To analyze this question, some commentators distinguish between
product related production and process methods (pr-PPMs) and nonproduct related production and process methods (npr-PPMs), the difference
being that the production methods are in some way incorporated into the
physical product (perhaps in only a trace amount) in the former case and
not in the latter.59 As demonstrated in Japan–Alcohol, the WTO does not
always allow discrimination where the differences relate to the final
products themselves (i.e., shochu versus vodka and other spirits).60
Nonetheless, where similar products produced through different methods
58
Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products ¶ 7.2415, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R & WT/DS293/R
(Sept. 29, 2006).
59
Low, Marceau & Reinaud, supra note 38, at 7.
60
Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 26, ¶ 32.
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have physical differences as a result, the WTO tends to recognize that the
distinction can serve as a foundation for attacking their “likeness.”61 The
jurisprudence is more ambiguous, however, for measures distinguishing
products as not “like” based solely on npr-PPMs (e.g., a product of child
slave labor versus a physically indistinguishable product made in
accordance with recognized international labor standards).62 The unadopted US–Tuna report, for example, presumed that products differing
only in terms of their npr-PPMs must be “like,” whereas the EC–Asbestos
holding suggested that npr-PPMs can be relevant to the likeness
determination.63 Specifically, the AB in EC – Asbestos clarified that:
the “characteristics” of a product include, in our view, any
objectively definable “features,” “qualities,” “attributes,” or other
”distinguishing mark” of a product. Such “characteristic”’ might
relate, inter alia, to a product’s composition, size, shape, color,
texture, hardness, tensile strength, flammability, conductivity,
density, or viscosity . . . .64
However, the AB then proceeded to add that:
product characteristics include, not only features and qualities
intrinsic to the product itself, but also related “characteristics,”
such as the means of identification, the presentation and the
appearance of a product . . . .65
In this regard, the AB appeared to hold that the likeness determination
can consider more than physical characteristics, but did not go so far as to
definitively state that the difference could be in the form of an npr-PPM.66
Another case that came close to answering the question of whether a
distinction in “likeness” can be made on the grounds of an npr-PPM was
61

See, e.g., GATT Panel Report, United States–Taxes on Petroleum and Certain
Imported Substances, L/6175 - 34S/136 at 17-19 (June 5, 1987) (adopted June, 17
1987) [hereinafter “GATT Panel Report, United States–Superfund”] (allowing a
difference in tax treatment where an otherwise identical product contained traces of a
specific chemical).
62
Id. at 7.
63
Id.
64
Appellate Body Report EC–Asbestos supra note 27, ¶ 67.
65
Id.
66
See Joost Pauwelyn, Working Paper, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and
Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law,
NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVT’L POL. SOL. 27 (Apr. 2007).
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the US—Superfund case.67 In US—Superfund, the Panel permitted the U.S.
to extend a domestic tax on specific chemicals to imports that used the
same chemicals.68 Unfortunately, however, the Panel did not specify
whether the chemicals needed to be physically present in the product, or
merely used in the production process, leaving the question open.69
Joost Pauwelyn, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute
of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, looks to
the language from Article II:2(a) permitting “charges on imports equivalent
to internal taxes imposed in respect of an article from which the imported
product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part” to argue
that npr-PPMs can potentially be “part of” the imported product.70 Other
commentators look to the portion of Article III:2 saying that imports “shall
not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like
domestic products,” to argue that the imposition of taxes on npr-PPMs at
the border is consistent with national treatment.71 Patrick Low and
Gabrielle Marceau of the WTO, and Julia Reinaud of the Institute for
Industrial Productivity, point out that both of these provisions, however,
only refer to taxes and charges and not to non-price regulations.72
Consequently, many of the types of regulations generally applied to
businesses to protect labor (e.g., the right to form a union, prohibitions on
child and prison labor, maximum work hour limits, etc.) may be difficult to
require for imports on such grounds.
4.

Pauwelyn View

Although Joost Pauwelyn generally holds the belief that products
different only in terms of their production process will be considered
“like,” he notes that, in theory, two otherwise identical products could be
shown as not “like” based on differences in consumer preference (e.g.,
consumers demonstrate measurably different market preferences with
respect to “fair trade” coffee versus exploitative coffee).73 Pauwelyn does
this by showing that the WTO cases use four criteria to judge likeness: (1)
67

GATT Panel Report, United States—Superfund, supra note 61.
Id. ¶¶ 17-19.
69
Id.
70
Low, Marceau & Reinaud, supra note 38, at 8 (citing Pauwelyn, supra note 66, at
19-20). The Graduate Institute, Joost Pauwelyn, Professor of International Law
http://graduateinstitute.ch/ctei/pauwelyn.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
71
Low, Marceau & Reinaud, supra note 38, at 8.
72
Id. at i and 8.
73
Pauwelyn, supra note 66, at fn. 76 (Apr. 2007) (citing Appellate Body Report EC –
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, supra note 27, ¶
101)).
68
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physical characteristics of the products; (2) end-use; (3) consumer tastes
and habits; and (4) tariff classification, picking out “consumer tastes and
habits” as the only criterion that could make otherwise physically identical
products different.74 But Pauwelyn then goes on to say that, if consumers
already prefer and will pay a premium for a product based on their tastes
and habits, then that circumstance alone would obviate the need for any
government-sponsored competitiveness provision.75
Changing consumer preference may itself be a way around the fact that
“product likeness” determinations focus on the product rather than the
process behind its manufacture. Certification marks, protected under
trademark law, are used to target both pr-PPMs and npr-PPMs.76 For
example, Kosher, ISO, fair trade, organic and other labels are licensed for
use subject to review by a private or public sector entity and their uses are
protected by international treaty.77 This scheme is weaker than trade
measures because one must trust that consumers will become educated
enough to identify the labels and then take moral responsibility by paying
what could potentially be more for the certified product.78 There is also a
risk that other parties will create similar labels that result in consumer
confusion and undermine the purpose of standards-based trademark
labeling. In Dolphin-Tuna, the United States attempted unsuccessfully to
require that all tuna imports obtain a certification mark that the product was

74
Id. These factors appear in Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, supra note 26, at Subsection H.1(a). The factors originally come from
Border Tax Adjustment Report, supra note 36, ¶18.
75
See Pauwelyn, supra note 66, at 76.
76
See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO), Certification
Marks,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/collective_marks/certification_marks.htm (last
visited May 8, 2012); U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, FAQ, Frequently Asked
Questions about Trademarks >> What is a Certification Mark?,
http://www.uspto.gov/faq/trademarks.jsp (last visited May 8, 2012).
77
See, e.g., Standard Certification Marks, TECHNIK.NET, http://www.technick.net/
public/code/cp_dpage.php?aiocp_dp=guide_safetymarks (last visited May 8, 2012).
See generally PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MADRID AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE
INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION OF MARKS adopted at Madrid on June 27, 1989, as
amended on Oct. 3, 2006 and on Nov. 12, 2007, available at http://www.wipo.
int/treaties/en/registration/madrid_protocol/. COMMON REGULATIONS UNDER THE
MADRID AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION OF MARKS AND
THE PROTOCOL RELATING TO THAT AGREEMENT at Rule 9(4)(a)(x) as in force on Jan. 1,
2012, available at http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_texts/common_regulations.
htm (protecting certification marks).
78
Howse and Regan suggest that the cost to the extra consumer of purchasing the
certified product may serve as a major factor in the effectiveness of this approach,
particularly where consumers must act collectively to effect a particular social
objective and the individual consumer lacks any guarantee that others will make the
same economic sacrifice. See supra note 38, at 273.
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“dolphin safe,” per a specific set of processes and standards.79 However,
this additional intervention by the government (i.e., a government mandate
that all imports bear a certain standards-certifying mark) might not be
necessary in order for the certifying mark to have a significant effect on the
market.
5. Howse and Regan Approach
Robert L. Howse, the Lloyd C. Nelson Professor of International Law at
the New York University School of Law, and Donald Regan, the William
W. Bishop Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law at the University of Michigan
Department of Philosophy, take a very different stance on the likeness
question by arguing that process of production is only relevant to the
likeness analysis insofar as it indicates whether a measure is protectionist in
nature, which is the primary issue at the heart of the national treatment
analysis.80 To justify this argument, Howse and Regan look to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter “Vienna Convention”).81 By
default, the Vienna Convention applies only between states and not
necessarily to treaties between states and international organizations;
however, in the interests of clarity and predictability in the dispute system,
WTO panels consistently refer to the Vienna Convention in interpreting the
GATT.82 Moreover, the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which includes
rules that Members agree to follow in resolving disputes, explicitly states
that WTO agreements will be clarified “in accordance with customary rules
of interpretation of public international law,” giving the WTO dispute
settlement body possible grounds for drawing on the Vienna Convention as
a widely accepted international treaty providing rules of treaty
interpretation.83 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention says that “A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
79

Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 18.
New York University School of Law, Robert Howse, https://its.law.nyu.edu/
facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?personID=28550 (last visited Feb. 23, 2013); University of
Michigan,
Donald
Reagan,
http://www.lsa.umich.edu/philosophy/people/ci.
regandonald_ci.detail (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
81
Howse & Regan, supra note 38, at 261.
82
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 1-5, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (defining to treaties as “between states” and clarifying that
the Convention only applies between states and not between states and international
organizations, except under specific circumstances); Peter C. Maki, Note: Interpreting
GATT Using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Method to Increase the
Legitimacy of the Dispute Settlement System, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 343, 352
(2000) (noting that this clarify form the Convention allows panels to avoid case-bycase analysis); Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 29 (1999); Howse &
Regan, supra note 38, at 261.
83
See DSU, supra note 53.
80
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to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.” In an attempt to identify the “ordinary meaning” of
“likeness” as referenced in GATT Article III, Howse and Regan then argue
that:
If we assign “like” its ordinary meaning in context, “not differing
in any respect relevant to an actual non-protectionist regulatory
policy,” then physically identical products that differ only in their
processing histories may be “unlike” because the processing
differences may be relevant to such a policy.84
They then emphasize that Article I and Article III do not suggest that any
particular regulatory policies are inadmissible, except favoritism between
nations and protectionism, and therefore do not expressly rule out nprPPM-based trade measures.85 Howse and Regan read Article III(2)&(4),
which deal with likeness, in light of Article III(1), which lays out the
general anti-protectionist policy of national treatment, concluding that the
interpretative focus should not primarily be on comparing the physical
traits of products, but rather on whether the measure is protectionist vis-àvis foreign imports.86 They also counter commentators who say that the
“aims” and “effects” of a measure are central in the likeness analysis by
explaining that those factors are only important insofar as they are essential
in determining whether a particular measure constitutes protectionism.87
Under the Howse and Regan view, a product can be distinguished as not
“like” another physically identical product by virtue of a difference in
process, and a trade measure might treat the two products differently even
if those products are economic substitutes.88 For example, a product made
under ILO-acceptable labor standards might be distinguishable from an
otherwise identical product made at below those standards. According to
Howse and Regan, the WTO assesses the legitimacy of the distinction by

84

Howse & Regan, supra note 38, at 261
Id.
86
Id. at 268. It is worth noting that in the portion of the holding in Japan–Alcohol
concerning likeness, the AB also explicitly draws on the “ordinary meaning” of Article
III(2). See id. at 260. It is also worth noting that Howse and Regan’s approach is very
similar to (and consistent with) the “less favorable treatment” approach described
above, which overrides other standards by getting directly at the competitive effects of
the measure and, in particular, whether those effects suggest a protectionist intent. See
supra notes 61-64.
87
Howse & Regan, supra note 38, at 261.
88
See generally id. at 269 (comparing “process-based” and “ county-based”
restrictions on turtle-friendly shrimp nets and turtle-unfriendly shrimp nets).
85
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asking only whether the measure is protectionist.89 These commentators
further assert that even if a secondary purpose is to eliminate the
competitive disadvantage of domestic producers (in this case, by bearing
the costs associated with compliance with the ILO Conventions or other
internationally recognized labor standards), accounting for this economic
externality serves the primary purpose of ensuring a minimum labor
standard for all workers, and is therefore not in itself protectionism.90
Howse and Regan go on to emphasize that consumers in a Member country
may care equally about social issues that happen at home and abroad, so
the fact that a Member claiming discrimination might (hypothetically) not
share the same concerns (here, minimum labor standards) may be
immaterial where the member imposing the restriction does care about the
issue as it applies universally.91
In looking at which measures are and are not likely to pass as nonprotectionist, Howse and Regan comment that labor legislation that by its
nature applies differently in different geographic areas, such as minimum
wage standards, will be harder to uphold, whereas universal norms such as
against slave or child labor would be easier to support as grounds for nonprotectionist trade measures.92 Given purchasing power and other
differences, minimum wage requirements would be particularly hard to set
and justify as part of a trade measure.93 If Howse and Regan are correct in
their analysis, Members may succeed in implementing trade measures that
treat products differently depending upon the process by which they were
produced, and those policies with the greatest chance of passing WTO
scrutiny as nondiscriminatory per Article I and Article III would be those
based on universal principles (rather than those that may apply differently
in one country context versus another, such as a reasonable standard for
minimum wage).
Howse and Regan believe that the product/process distinction is not the
central determinant of “likeness.” However, other scholars who believe that
the “likeness” standards in Article I and Article III leave no space for
distinguishing goods based on differences in process often look to the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”), which
89

See id. at 272 (interpreting objections to the trade measures that are justified by the
value of their consequences to mean trade measure adopted without protectionist
motives have no efficiency costs).
90
The examples provided by Howse and Regan derive from the facts of ShrimpTurtle, but the same arguments would here apply to labor rights. Id. at 280.
91
Id. at 281. Howse and Reagan also argue that, regarding the question of “who gets
to decide” a moral belief, it must be the right of the country to make such
determinations independently insofar as actions apply within that country’s borders. Id.
at 281-82.
92
Id. at 284.
93
Id.
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applies to technical regulations that “lay down product characteristics or
their related processes and production methods.”94 Under the TBT
Agreement, technical standards must comply with the Code of Good
Practice.95 The Code emphasizes standardization, requires collective
standard-setting with periods of review, forbids the creation of standards
constituting protectionism, and discourages the creation of unnecessary
obstacles to trade.96 Because the TBT Agreement is aimed at unifying
international standards as much as possible, it might represent an inroad for
the application of internationally agreed upon labor standards.97
D. GATT Article VI – Subsidies, dumping, and countervailing
duties
Michael J. Treblicock, Professor of Law at the University of Toronto,
and Robert Howse discuss the possibility of using GATT Article VI AntiDumping and Countervailing Duties to make a case that countries not
meeting internationally-recognized labor standards engage in “social
dumping,” or indirect and implicit subsidization.98 They are quick to reject
this approach because low-cost, low-skilled labor is arguably critical to
developing countries’ competitive advantage in many instances; because
economic studies on the effects of trade with low-wage economies show
that these lower wages do relatively little (versus other factors such as
technological change or public investments in education, health care,
infrastructure, or law enforcement) to drive down wages for low-skill jobs
in competitor economies; and because economic theory suggests that the
immediate imposition of common international labor standards modeled on
existing developed-country standards would reduce economic welfare in all
countries (including both importers and exporters).99
The “social dumping” approach closely mirrors Joseph Stiglitz’s
proposal that excessive carbon emissions in inadequately regulated
94

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal Instruments-Results of
the Uruguay Round, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 (1994) [hereinafter “TBT Agreement”].
95
Id. at Article 4.
96
Id. at Annex 3; Treblicock & Howse, supra note 17, at 292.
97
See SARAH JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO?: A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 128
(2011) (considering the ILO standards as a possible candidate for inclusion through the
TBT Agreement because “they might be deemed to be based on an international
standard and therefore ‘rebuttably presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to
trade’ under Article 2(5).”)
98
See Treblicock & Howse, supra note 17, at 266.
99
Id. at 267-69.
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countries should be treated as unfair subsidies because, in such cases, the
firms are not paying for the full cost of production.100 In the labor context,
the argument would be that, by putting an unjustifiable burden on the
worker (e.g., through unreasonably long hours, child labor, inadequate pay,
etc.), the firm is not paying the full production cost. Joost Pauwelyn rejects
this argument because the WTO rules say that a subsidy is a financial
contribution by a government, whereas this type of “subsidy” involves only
a failure by the government to act.101 Pauwelyn also points to the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, which clarifies that
countervailing duties to offset foreign government subsidies can be levied
only where the subsidy is “specific to an enterprise or industry or group of
enterprises or industries . . . within the jurisdiction of the granting
authority.”102 Therefore, where the counterpart government has not targeted
any particular business units within its jurisdiction or provided a formal
subsidy (rather than simply failing to act), it seems the WTO subsidies
rules will not apply.
Where the subsidy argument might succeed, however, is where the
government’s failure to act when “government revenue that is otherwise
due is foregone or not collected.”103 In United States–Tax Treatment for
“Foreign Sales Corporations,” the WTO AB determined that what is
“otherwise due” refers to “the prevailing domestic standard of the Member
in question.”104 China, for example, is an ILO member country and has
various laws protecting labor rights.105 To the extent that another Member
can demonstrate that China knowingly neglects enforcement and/or enables
companies to violate these existing laws, it is conceivable that a case can be
made for calling this a ‘subsidy’ equivalent to a financial contribution by
the government.106 This may be a hard case to make, however, if the
violations are not in an easily quantifiable form (e.g., foregone pension,
100
Joseph Stiglitz, A New Agenda for Global Warming, 9 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, July
2006, available at http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ev.2006.3.7/ev.2006.3.7.1210/
ev.2006.3.7.1210.xml?format=INT.
101
Pauwelyn, supra note 66, at 14-15.
102
Id. at 15 (citing WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling Measures,
Articles 1.2, 22, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf).
103
Id. at Article 1.1(a)(ii).
104
WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted on 20 March 2000, ¶ 90.
105
ILO Labour Act–China (July 5, 1994) available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/
docs/WEBTEXT/37357/64926/E94CHN01.htm.
106
C.f., Stanley James, Foxconn Auditor Finds ‘Serious’ Violations of Chinese Law,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2012), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0329/foxconn-auditor-finds-serious-violations-of-chinese-law.html (discussing how the
violations uncovered at Foxconn were in violation of China’s domestic labor laws).
Presumably, these violations would need to be systematically and deliberately ignored
such that they reflected a conscious and deliberate effort on the part of the Chinese
government to provide a benefit to companies. This may be extremely difficult to
show.
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medical, or other payments) and absent strong evidence of an intent to give
advantage to domestic companies (i.e., rather than mere ineptness in
enforcement).
E. GATT Article XI – General Elimination of Quantitative
Restrictions
GATT Article XI reflects a preference toward tariffs over quotas that is a
“cornerstone” of the GATT and dates back to the Uruguay Round, in which
the original Members sought to phase out quantitative restrictions for
textiles and agriculture.107 Article XI:1 begins by stating that:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained . . . on
the importation of any product . . . .108
As this text indicates, Article XI applies generally to the importation of
products, regardless of the form of the restriction.109 Moreover, in addition
to a quota or other partial limit on imports, an outright ban on a certain
product would also constitute a “quantitative restriction” (i.e., of zero) and
therefore would be inconsistent with GATT Article XI:1.110
Even where a measure imposes a quantitative restriction, or violates
MFN, national treatment, or some other combination of GATT rules, it
may nonetheless be justified and therefore allowed, provided that it falls
within one or more of the exceptions provided under the General
Exceptions Clause.
III. GATT ARTICLE XX – THE GENERAL EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE
Article XX of the GATT, the General Exceptions Clause, offers a right
to Member countries to discriminate in violation of other GATT
obligations where such discrimination is justified as specified in one or
107

Panel Report, Turkey–Textiles, ¶¶ 9.63-9.65, WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999).
GATT, art. XI(1).
109
Panel Report, India–Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, ¶¶ 7.318-7.322
WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R (Dec. 21, 2001) (holding that, because the standard
concerns whether some restriction applies to imports, even non-border measures may in
some instances violate Article XI); Panel Report on US–Shrimp, ¶ 7.16 WT/DS58/R
(May 15, 1998) (holding that certifications can amount to “prohibitions or restrictions”
per Article XI(1)).
110
Panel Report, Canada—Periodicals, ¶ 5.5, WT/DS31/R (Mar. 14, 1997).
108
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more of the listed exceptions.111 Exception (e) provides an exception
“relating to the products of prison labour.”112 The “relating to” clause is
normally interpreted relatively broadly by the WTO Appellate Body.113
A.GATT Article XX(e) – Products of Prison Labor
The ILO addresses the use of prison labor in the Forced Labour
Convention (No. 29).114 Under the ILO definition,
forced or compulsory labour shall mean all work or service which
is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and
for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.115
For government-sponsored punitive labor, the ILO makes an exception;
however, the requirement that an individual must offer him/herself
“voluntarily” still applies when companies utilize prison labor.116 To the
extent that the relationship between the company and the prisoner does not
resemble that of free labor, the ILO recognizes the relationship as involving
labor rights abuse.117 Therefore, products of prison labor are not necessarily
labor rights abuses, but in many cases might reflect abuses, particularly
where the products originate from private companies (i.e., rather than
government-owned and -managed institutions).
If a Member seeks to apply a quantitative restriction in the form of a ban
to products of prison labor, that action would invoke Article XI of the

111

See GATT, art. XX.
Id. at XX(e).
113
Id. As compared to exceptions that use the language “necessary to . . .” Pauwelyn,
supra note 66, at fn. 93.
114
Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, ILO No. 29, (June 28,
1930) [hereinafter “Forced Labor Convention”].
115
Id. at art. 2(1).
116
The definition makes an exception for “any work or service exacted from any
person as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law, provided that the said work
or service is carried out under the supervision and control of a public authority and that
the said person is not hired to or placed at the disposal of private individuals,
companies or associations” Id. at art. 2(2)(c). But the Convention does not give the
same exception to non-government entities: “No concession granted to private
individuals, companies or associations shall involve any form of forced or compulsory
labour for the production or the collection of products which such private individuals,
companies or associations utilise or in which they trade.” Id. at art. 5(1).
117
See ILO, Q&As on Business and Forced Labour >> Use of prison labour (last
updated Sept. 01, 2010), http://www.ilo.org/empent/areas/business-helpdesk/faqs/
WCMS_DOC_ENT_HLP_FL_FAQ_EN/lang--en/index.htm (offering a set of
indicators used by the ILO to determine whether the conditions of employment are
similar to those of a free labor relationship).
112
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GATT, Quantitative Restrictions.118 An outright ban would represent a
prohibition or restriction in violation of the Article; however, the Member
could justify that violation by showing (1) that the ban does indeed serve to
restrict products of prison labor under exception (e) of the Article XX and
that (2) the measure is tailored narrowly so as not to violate the chapeau of
Article XX, which says that the measure must not involve:
(a) “arbitrary discrimination” (between countries where the same
conditions prevail);
(b) “unjustifiable discrimination” (with the same qualifier); or
(c) a “disguised restriction” on international trade.119
The chapeau is said to embody the international law principle of “good
faith.”120 Although Article XX(e) specifically allows for restrictions on
products of prison labor, a ban on such products that is needlessly overprotective will violate the chapeau and be deemed as not justified under
Article XX. In U.S.–Shrimp, the AB characterized the chapeau as striking a
balance between the WTO Member’s right to invoke an Article XX
exception and the same Member’s duty to respect the rights of other
members, as evaluated on a case-by-case basis.121
The AB in U.S.–Shrimp found that arbitrary discrimination exists when a
measure fails to account for the fact that different countries face different
circumstances.122 A country imposing a ban on prison labor thus would
need to evaluate the costs that its restriction would impose on other WTO

118

See GATT, art. XI.
119 This language, quoted from the Appellate Body, isolates each of the three main
conditions given in the chapeau. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, p. 23WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996)
[hereinafter US—Gasoline]. The Appellate Body then writes that “‘Arbitrary
discrimination’, ‘unjustifiable discrimination’ and ‘disguised restriction’ on
international trade may . . . be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to one another. It
is clear to us that ‘disguised restriction’ includes disguised discrimination in
international trade.” Id. at p. 25. See also Joshua Meltzer, Climate Change and Trade –
The EU Aviation Directive and the WTO, 15 J. INT'L ECON. L. 111, 140, 144 (Mar.
2012) (stating that the Article XX chapeau “focuses on ensuring that the measure has
not been applied in ways that constitute arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination or
that is a disguised restriction on international trade.”).
120
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶ 158, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter “U.S.–Shrimp”].
121
Id. ¶¶ 156, 159. Accordingly, the AB in U.S.–Shrimp was explicit that that the
first step is to evaluate whether the measure in question corresponds to a right listed in
Article XX, then the second step is to evaluate whether the measure is applied fairly or
abuses the right(s) invoked. Id. ¶¶ 119–20 (citing U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 119, ¶ 22).
122
U.S.–Shrimp, supra note 120, ¶ 177.
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Members, including the administrative and producer costs of meeting new
standards or baselines.123 Depending upon how the Member requires
approval or certification to meet the conditions of the ban before it may
import products, a country or its producers might need to effect significant
procedural changes, and these changes may be costly. Particularly where
systems and procedures for identifying products of prison labor are already
in place in other Member countries, the Member imposing the ban should
focus on whether another measure is comparable in effectiveness, enables
exporting countries to take advantage of their own capacities and unique
circumstances, and yet still achieves the outcome desired.124
Where costs are foreseeable and not “merely inadvertent or
unavoidable,” the measure will be deemed to represent “unjustifiable
discrimination” and a “disguised restriction on international trade” where
such costs are not mitigated.125 This puts an obligation on the Member
putting forward the measure to provide other Members with an opportunity
to be heard, to hear arguments against the measure, and to give a written
decision.126 Where a Member fails to offer such a review as a matter of
procedural fairness and due process, the measure will be found to represent
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination.127 Moreover, the manner of
application of the measure itself should be transparent and predictable (i.e.,
rather than “informal” or “casual”) in order to adequately notify exporting
Members of what steps they must take to reasonably ensure compliance.128
123

Cf., U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 119, ¶¶ 28–29 (faulting the United States dually
for failing to “explore adequately means . . . of mitigating the administrative problems
relied on for rejecting individual baselines for foreign refiners; and to count the costs
for foreign refiners that would result from the imposition of statutory baselines”).
124
See Meltzer supra note 119, at 146. Meltzer emphasizes that a measure that does
not acknowledge other approaches that effectively achieve the same policy goal by
different means will tend to be interpreted by the dispute resolution body as an
inappropriate attempt to force other countries to conform their polices accordingly, and
rejected as arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination inconsistent with WTO
commitments. Id. citing US–Shrimp, supra note 120, ¶ 165. The AB was specifically
concerned with the uniform nature of the measure applied by the U.S., noting, for
example, that some shrimp exports would be excluded from the U.S. market using
methods identical to those used in the U.S., solely because they were caught in the
waters of countries not certified by the U.S. Id. ¶¶. 164-5.
125
This was the finding in US–Gasoline, where the measure complied with Article
XX(g), but the discrimination was foreseen and the U.S. was found responsible for an
“omission” by failing to mitigate in advance. US–Gasoline, supra note 119.
126
Appellate Body Report on US—Shrimp, supra note 120, ¶¶ 180-83. In US–Shrimp,
the AB faulted the U.S. for failing to negotiate with Asian countries to accommodate
their existing measures for reducing turtle deaths from shrimp trawling and instead
applying U.S. standards. Id. ¶ 161.
127
Id. ¶ 184.
128
The AB in US–Shrimp deemed the “rigidity and inflexibility” of the U.S.
certification process to constitute “arbitrary discrimination” under the chapeau. Id. ¶
177. The AB also found “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination where the same
conditions prevail” on the basis of “due process” where the approval process was
“informal” and “casual” and where prospective importers did not have an opportunity
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If a ban on goods produced with prison labor falls squarely under the
Article XX(e) exception and thus is carefully tailored to eliminate
unnecessary costs, respects existing approaches that effect the same policy
objective, and extends opportunities for due process and procedural
fairness to dissenting Members, then the measure would likely succeed
under the Article XX(e) exception, even if found discriminatory under one
or more other articles of the GATT.
Looking back to the ILO definition of forced and compulsory labor, it is
worth noting that the ILO does not perceive all forms of prison labor as
labor rights abuses.129 One may therefore wonder whether the WTO would
be willing to apply Article XX(e) where the party creating the product is a
government using punitive prison labor, or a company meeting all of the
ILO indicators that evidence a prison labor relationship approximating that
of a free labor relationship.130 Would the WTO look at Article XX(e) on its
face, which seems to unequivocally and universally justify a ban on any
product of prison labor, or would it look to the intent of the rule and hold
that what the international community agrees are “acceptable” forms of
prison labor do not in fact qualify for the Article XX exception? It is
possible that the WTO will find the policy to represent arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination if it is overbroad in that it bans more forms of
prison labor than captured within the stated policy objectives of the
Member implementing the measure, i.e., if the Member itself allows certain
forms of prison labor or bases the measure on a standard (like the ILO
standard) that condones certain forms of prison labor.
It is worth noting that an alternative means for circumventing the
GATT’s various restrictions on “discriminatory” treatment is for a Member
to obtain an explicit exception as part of its negotiated schedule of
concessions.131 The U.S., for example, bans the importation of products
made by convict labor, forced labor, and indentured labor as part of the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, under the Tariff Act of
1930.132 GATT Article II governs import tariffs at the border, providing in
relevant part that products identified in Part I of a Member’s Schedule are
subject to the terms set forth in the Schedule.133 Although the U.S. would
have a good chance of succeeding in effecting a similar outcome using the
to review the reasons underlying certifications decisions, or to appeal those decisions.
Id. ¶¶ 180-81.
129
See supra notes 115-18.
130
Id.
131
See Subpart 0 (discussing schedules of concessions).
132
19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2006).
133
See supra Subsection 0.
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Article XX(e) exception for products of prisoner labor, according to GATT
Article II, countries like the U.S. that pre-negotiated such bans (or other
restrictions) into their WTO Schedules do not need to rely upon other parts
of the GATT to support their otherwise discriminatory or trade-restrictive
practices.
But suppose that the U.S. seeks to use trade measures to combat
perceived human rights violations beyond those related to prison labor, and
suppose that another article of the GATT deems these measures to be
discriminatory. Although GATT and WTO trade rounds have included
debates on labor standards since 1948, the WTO never addressed the issue
in its negotiating rounds, nor explicitly incorporated labor standards into its
trade framework, in part due to opposition from developing countries.134
Louis Henkin Professor in Human and Constitutional Rights and Faculty
Co-Director of the Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, Sarah
H. Cleveland, points to the Article XX(a) exception for measures
“necessary to protect public morals” and the Article XX(b) exception for
measures “necessary to protect human . . . life” as those that “most
plausibly allow for human rights sanctions.”135
B. GATT Article XX(a) – Public Morals
Steve Charnovitz, Associate Professor of Law at The George
Washington University, suggested that the American proposal to include a
public morals exception clause when the GATT was negotiated was in
defense of a series of trade restrictions already negotiated, including
“intoxicating liquors, smoking opium and narcotic drugs, lottery tickets,
obscene and immoral articles, counterfeits, pictorial representations of
prize fights, and the plumage of certain birds.”136 Charnovitz concluded
134

Joshua M. Kagan, Making Free Trade Fair: How the WTO Could Incorporate
Labor Rights and Why It Should, 43 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 198 (2011) (explaining that
the labor rights issue received little support during the 1978 Tokyo Round and that,
during the 1994 Uruguay Round, developing countries opposed a proposal to form a
study group to examine labor rights in free trade); Robert Howse, Brian Langille &
Julien Burda, The World Trade Organization and Labor Rights: Man Bites Dog, in
Social Issues, Globalisation and International Institutions Labour Rights and the EU,
ILO, OECD and WTO 192 (Virginia A. Leary & Daniel Warner eds., 2006) (explaining
how developing countries defeated attempts by the United States and European Union
to include a working group and working forum on labor at the 1999 Seattle Ministerial
Conference).
135
Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory
of Compatibility 5 H. INT’L ECON. L. 133, 157 (2002). Joshua Kagan makes a similar
assertion. Kagan, supra note 134, at 209. Columbia Law School, Sarah H. Cleveland,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Sarah_Cleveland (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
136
Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 689,
706 (1998) (quoting a letter from Frank B. Kellog, Sec’y of State, to Wilson, Minister
in Switzerland (Oct. 6, 1927) in 1 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
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that the drafting history shed little light on the meaning of the clause.137
The exception subsequently went uninterpreted by the WTO for over fifty
years, in part because Members were reluctant to challenge the exception
out of concern that the inherent ambiguity of “public morals” meant that
that too narrow or broad of an interpretation by the WTO could either
threaten national sovereignty or lead to exploitative overuse of the
exception.138 Consequently, the first jurisprudence regarding the
circumstances enabling the invocation of part (a) of the General Exceptions
Clause, allowing an exception where “necessary to protect public morals,”
did not emerge until 2005 in U.S.–Gambling.139
1. U.S. – Gambling
U.S.–Gambling concerned a trade dispute brought by Antigua and
Barbuda alleging the illegality of a U.S. ban on cross-border gambling and
betting services, resulting in the decline of the Internet-based offshore
gaming industry that accounted for ten percent of the island nation’s
GDP.140 The U.S. justified its ban on online gambling as necessary because
the service encouraged organized crime, money laundering, and fraud and
consumer crimes, as well as endangering public health (related to gambling
addictions) and children and youth (by increasing access to underage
gambling), together posing “a grave threat to the maintenance of the public
order and the protection of public morals.”141 U.S.–Gambling related to

UNITED STATES 1927, at 254, 257 (1942)). The George Washington University,
Steve Charnovitz, http://www.law.gwu.edu/faculty/profile.aspx?id=7541 (last visited
Feb. 24, 2013).
137
Charnovitz, supra note 136, at 704-05, 730-31.
138
Id.; Christoph T. Feddersen, Focusing on Substantive Law in International
Economic Relations: The Public Morals of Gatt's Article XX(a) and ‘Conventional’
Rules of Interpretation, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 75, 77 (1998) (observing that the
“ambiguous and rather obscure wording of Article XX(a) invites possible misuse.”.
This concern has not been fully resolved by newer case law). See infra notes 155-57
(discussing the continuum between universalist and unilateralist interpretations of
“public morals”).
139
Mark Wu, Free Trade and the Protection of Public Morals: An Analysis of the
newly Emerging Public Morals Clause Doctrine, 33 YALE J. INT. L. 215, 216 (2008).
140
First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, United States–Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 35 WT/DS285 (Oct. 1,
2003), available at http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/business_politics/pdf/Antigua
_First_Submission.pdf.
141
See Executive Summary of the Second Written Submission of the United States,
United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, ¶ 22-23, 37, WT/DS285 (Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Dispute
_Settlement_Listings/asset_upload_file665_5581.pdf.
THE
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services rather than goods; however, the “public morals” clause of General
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) Article XIV is substantially
similar to the “public morals” clause of GATT Art. XX(a), such that the
GATT “public morals” analysis from U.S.–Gasoline is relevant in
interpreting the analogous “public morals” exception of the GATS and
vice-versa.142
Antigua countered the U.S. justification, arguing that the U.S. had shown
“insufficient evidence of organized crime involvement,” that its regulatory
scheme sufficiently addressed U.S. concerns, that the U.S. rejected offers to
consult on Antigua’s gambling scheme in advance of instituting the
measure, and that age verification and other technologies existed and
“would be less restrictive on international trade than a total prohibition.”143
Consequently, Antigua argued that the measure failed to meet the
“necessary to . . .” requirement of the “public morals” exception, and that
the discriminatory nature of the ban (vis-à-vis domestic service providers
competing locally rather than remotely) violated the chapeau of GATS
Article XIV(a), which requires measures protecting public morals to be
nondiscriminatory.144
In its decision, the WTO Panel defined public morals as “standards of
right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or
nation” and concluded that gambling could potentially fall under the
exception.145 Nonetheless, the Panel held that in this case the U.S. failed to
“provisionally justify” that its statutes were “necessary to protect public
morals and/or public order within the meaning” of the “public morals”
exception because it neglected to adequately explore possible alternatives,
rejected Antigua’s offer to negotiate a compromise, and failed to prove
convincingly that it treated foreign providers in a manner consistent with
the manner it treated domestic providers of gambling services.146 The AB
subsequently affirmed the Panel’s ruling that the U.S. had failed to
demonstrate that its restrictions were nondiscriminatory vis-à-vis
competing foreign providers of gambling services, but overturned the
142

Jeremy C. Marwell, Note, Trade and Morality: The WTO Public Morals
Exception After Gambling, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 804 (2006).
143
Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 3.288, 3.291, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004)
[hereinafter U.S.–Gambling]; First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, supra 140, ¶¶
42-74; Sir Ronald Sanders, Chief Foreign Affairs Representative with Ministerial
Rank, Opening Statement at the First Panel Meeting in the Dispute Between Antigua
and Barbuda and the United States on Internet Gambling ¶ 4 (Dec. 10, 2003), available
at http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/business_politics/docs/First_Panel_Meeting.doc.
144
U.S.–Gambling, supra note 143, ¶ 3.292. Again, this exception is interpreted
analogously with the “public morals” exception of GATT Article XX(a). See Marwel,
supra note 142.
145
Id.
146
Id. ¶¶ 6.474, 6.531-35, 6.607-08.
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Panel’s decision that it lacked the grounds to assert that the U.S. de facto
failed to meet the “necessary to . . .” requirement because Antigua had not
met its obligation to first identify a less restrictive alternative to a ban.147
The AB decision in U.S.–Gambling unfortunately leaves several questions
unanswered, including whether the exception can be applied only to
“inwardly-directed” measures intended to protect a Member’s own citizens,
as well as who defines what constitutes a “public moral.”148
2. Implications of U.S.–Gambling in a Potential Labor Rights
Application of Article XX(a)
Experts distinguish “inwardly-directed” trade measures, put in place by a
country to protect the morals of individuals within its jurisdiction, from
“outwardly-directed” trade measures, implemented to protect the morals of
individuals living beyond the country’s jurisdiction.149 A Member’s
measure protecting foreign workers would have an “outwardly-directed”
moral purpose.150 Prior to U.S.–Gambling, Members cited the “public
morals” exception to justify inwardly-directed bans on pornography,
narcotics, Kosher meat products (in Israel), and the importation of all
alcohol (in Indonesia).151 Some countries even used the exception to justify
overtly outwardly-facing trade measures. For example, the European
Community banned furs caught in nations that did not ban the use of
leghold traps in 1991, and the U.S. banned goods produced by indentured
child labor in 1997.152 But because all of these trade restrictions went
unchallenged, including ones based on religious grounds not explicitly
mentioned in the exception itself or in the original public morals discussion
surrounding Article XX(a)’s creation, it is unknown whether these various
exceptions would have stood up if disputed.153 Moreover, because U.S.–
Gambling concerned an inwardly-directed measure by the U.S.
147

Appellate Body Report, United States–Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, ¶¶ 311, 317-18, 343-57,
367-72 (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter “Appellate Body Report, U.S.–Gambling”].
148
Wu, supra note 139, at 216, 226, 231-36.
149
See Charnovitz supra note 136, at 695. Charnovitz provides as examples of
“inwardly-directed” measures the government of Israel’s ban on non-kosher meat
products and the U.S. government’s ban on the importation of “obscene” pictures as,
but also notes that this distinction is inherently “somewhat arbitrary” because
transactions always have two sides. Id. at 695-6.
150
Id. at 696.
151
See Wu supra note 139, at 222-23, Annex 1 (providing a complete list of trade
restrictions that relied on Article XX(a) for justification).
152
Id. at 223.
153
Id.
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Government to protect Americans from dangers that the government
associated with offshore gambling, the decision left open the question of
whether the U.S. could rely on the “public morals” exception to implement
an externally-directed measure targeting foreign labor practices affecting
non-U.S. parties.
Although, as originally drafted, the public morals exception made no
reference to human or labor rights, a number of commentators, and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), proposed that
the WTO should dynamically interpret GATT Article XX(a) to include
such rights.154 Mark Wu, Assistant Professor of Law at Harvard Law
School, distinguishes universalism and unilateralism as two potential
starting points for identifying those public morals that should fit within the
scope of the moral exception, but notes that the universe of norms on which
there is unanimous consensus may be both too small and too irrelevant,
given that universally held norms are, by definition, unlikely to be
challenged in the first place.155 Unilaterally-decided norms, on the other
hand, would be subjective and also difficult to challenge if used merely to
disguise protectionist trade measures.156 The Panel looked to existing
international practices, whereby sixteen countries already restricted or
prohibited Internet gambling, in determining that gambling could fall under
the “public morals” exception, and in doing so, appeared to reject both the
pure unilateralist and pure universalist approaches; however, U.S.–
Gambling did not ultimately define where, between those two extremes, a
particular restriction must fall in order to meet the Article XX(a) moral
exception.157 Additionally, Wu points out that the Panel and AB in U.S–
Gambling did not take a firm position regarding the extent to which a
Member must prove the legitimacy of the moral asserted to excuse its trade
measure, asserting only (ambiguously) that the public moral must be
“prevailing,” while sending “mixed signals” by acknowledging some
international rulings regarding the impacts of cross-border gambling but
overtly disregarding others.158
154
Id. at 224 (citing Treblicock & Howse, supra at note 17; Cleveland, supra at note
120; Stephen J. Powell, The Place of Human Rights Law in World Trade Organization
Rules, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 219, 223 (2004); Salman Bal, International Free Trade
Agreements and Human Rights: Reinterpreting Article XX of the GATT, 10 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 62, 78 (2001)); see also Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement
and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 753, 789 (2002); Office of the U.N. High
Comm’r for Refugees, Human Rights and World Trade Agreements: Using General
Exception Clauses to Protect Human Rights, at 5, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/05/5 (Nov.
2005). See Charnovitz, supra note 136 (providing an excerpt of the specific exceptions
originally targeted by the U.S. negotiators).
155
Wu supra note 139, at 231-32. Harvard Law School, Mark Wu, http://www.law.
harvard.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id=949 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
156
Wu supra note 139, at 231-32.
157
Id. at 232-33.
158
Id. at 233-35.
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At the same time, the decision in U.S.–Gambling did clarify that the
“necessary to . . .” language would be applied using the same three-factor
test applied for other exceptions using identical language, and that the
language in the chapeau regarding “arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination” would be interpreted in conformity with the principles
already established in prior cases.159 The Panel also stated “the content of
[public morals] can vary in time and space, depending upon a range of
factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious
values.”160 Multiple scholars equate the U.S.–Gambling Panel’s language
here, which subsequently went unmodified by the AB, to the “dynamic” or
“evolving” standard for interpreting exception XX(g) offered in ShrimpTurtle.161 Specifically, the AB in Shrimp-Turtle acknowledged that the
Article XX(g) exception for protecting natural resources did not at the time
of its drafting include living species, but nonetheless held that the
exception should now be interpreted as including them.162 The same
explicit flexibility in the scope of what qualifies as a “public moral” is
important because it means, doctrinally, that the “public morals” exception
need not be interpreted as static and therefore might now be read as
including labor rights not explicitly envisioned by the original signatories
of the GATT as “public morals.”
Looking back at the issues not fully answered by U.S.–Gambling, a labor
rights justification based on an internationally agreed-upon convention
such as the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
or the International Bill of Human Rights will have a good chance of
succeeding, assuming that it is found “necessary” and is not “arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination” under the common interpretations of the
“necessary to . . .” clauses and the chapeau. Even if future WTO decisions
fall on the more restrictive side of the universalism vs. unilateralism
spectrum, we know from US–Gambling that total consensus is not required
among member nations, so a generally accepted international convention
would probably be adequate to justify a consistent action in moral defense
of labor rights.163 Likewise, even if the legitimacy requirement is very high,
159
Panel Report, United States–Gambling, supra note 143, ¶ 6.492; Appellate Body
Report, U.S.–Gambling, supra note 147, ¶¶ 369, 371. Consequently, the chapeau
analysis in an Article XX(a) case arguing for a labor rights exception would apply the
chapeau in the same way seen above in the Article XX(e) analysis.
160
Panel Report, United States–Gambling, supra note 143, ¶ 6.461. This language
was not amended in the subsequent AB report.
161
See, e.g., Kagan supra note 134, at 209-10; Wu supra note 139, at 230-31.
162
U.S.−Shrimp, supra note 120, ¶ 129.
163
Joshua Kagan suggests that “morals” should be defined based on standards put
forward by the international human rights movement and that whether the morals are
“public” should depend upon the degree of state adoption and ratification of
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e.g., public opinion polls and legislative debates are found not to serve as
adequate evidence to justify the sincerity of an asserted moral stance, an
international convention that a country has signed (and consistently obeys)
should represent strong enough evidence that the asserted moral standard is
legitimate. Of all the public morals exception questions in US–Gambling
left to future panels to decide, the one that creates the most uncertainty for
the application of labor or human rights is the inwardly-facing/outwardlyfacing distinction. That is to say that, even if in the future a Member
applies a measure that it demonstrates to be (1) necessary under the
“necessary to . . .” condition, (2) nondiscriminatory under the chapeau, (3)
consistent with modern interpretations of public morals under the dynamic
interpretation language of US–Gambling, and (4) meeting a standard of
public morality demonstrated by signed international convention to be both
(A) nearly universal and (B) common, formal, and long-standing practice
in the Member country, a future Panel may nonetheless rule that (5) a
Member cannot justify an outwardly-directed trade restrictive measure, i.e.,
the measure can only be used to safeguard the morals of inhabitants within
one’s own country.164
It is additionally worth nothing that the 1994 WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement, which narrowly applies to government
procurements only, has a somewhat more broadly worded version of the
public morals exception.165 The text prohibits Members from preventing
each other from taking measures “necessary to protect public morals, order
or safety, human, animal or plant life or health or intellectual property; or
relating to the products or services of handicapped persons, of
philanthropic institutions or of prison labour.”166 In addition to some
language similar to Article XX(e) and wording identical to Article XX(a),
as well as some exceptions that do not appear in the General Exceptions
Clause, this compound exception mimics the wording of Article XX(b),

international human rights instruments, concluding that “the widespread state
ratification of the labor rights provisions of the ICCPR, ICESCR, the ILO Declaration,
and the ILO Fundamental Conventions creates a strong justification for viewing these
rights as universal and public.” Kagan, supra note 134, at 210.
164
Notably, Wu adds a further level of abstraction to Charnovitz’s
inwardly/outwardly facing distinction by suggesting a three-part division: Type I
restrictions safeguard the morals of inhabitants within one’s own country, Type II
restrictions relate to the protection of those directly involved in the production of the
product, and Type III restrictions target an exporting state which is engaging in
practices that the importing state finds offensive not related to the production of the
product. Wu, supra note 124, at 235. Here, the labor rights exceptions would fall under
Type II. If future Panels choose to adopt this tripartite distinction approach, it is
possible that certain outwardly-facing restrictions may be allowed (possibly including
labor rights-related restrictions) while others are disallowed).
165
GATT, at art. XXIII(2).
165
Id..
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which protects animal and plant life or health.167
3.

Later Jurisprudence on the “Necessary to” Standard

Multiple WTO cases have examined the “necessary to” standard that
appears in some of the Article XX exceptions, including Article XX(a). In
2000 Korea–Beef, a dispute brought by the U.S. and Australia alleging an
Article III:4 violation caused by Korea’s “dual retail system” for domestic
and imported beef, the AB noted that “necessity” under Article XX does
not require a showing that such measures are “indispensable.”168 The AB
also clarified that “[t]he more vital or important [the interests or values put
forward], the easier it would be to accept as “necessary” a measure
designed as an enforcement instrument.”169 Finally, the AB noted that the
“necessary” analysis should include a “determination of whether a WTOconsistent alternative measure which the member concerned could
‘reasonably employ’ is available, or whether a less WTO-inconsistent
measure is ‘reasonably available.’”170 These additional elements in the
“necessary to” analysis left a large degree of predictive uncertainty.171
The following year, EC–Asbestos revisited the issue, holding that the
WTO dispute settlement body will be deferential to a Member’s claim
regarding the degree of protection deemed adequate to secure the asserted
public morals. 172 For the measure under dispute to be deemed “necessary,”
however, it must be at least potentially capable of affording the same
degree of protection that the Member claims it needs.173
The aforementioned U.S.–Gambling case was the next to interpret the
public morals exception in 2005, with the AB overruling the Panel decision
that the U.S. did not satisfy the “reasonably available alternatives” element
because it “failed to pursue in good faith a course of action that could have
been used to explore the possibility of finding a reasonably available WTOconsistent alternative” on the grounds that the defending party only has the
burden of making a prima facie case that the measure is “necessary.”174
167

Id. at XX(b).
See Korea–Beef, supra note 54, ¶ 614.
169
Id. ¶ 162.
170
Id. ¶ 166 (quoting Panel Report, United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, ¶ 5.26, L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1989)).
171
Christopher Doyle, Gimme Shelter: The “Necessary” Element of Gatt Article XX
in the Context of the China-Audiovisual Products Case, 29 BOSTON U.L.J. 143, 155
(2011).
172
Appellate Body Report, EC–Asbestos, supra note 27, ¶ 172.
173
Id.
174
Appellate Body Report, U.S.–Gambling, ¶ 301, 309-11, 404.
168
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After the defending party makes the prima facie case, the complainant may
propose WTO-consistent alternatives, at which point the defending party
must explain why those alternatives are not “reasonably available,” for
example, because the alternative measure would be “merely theoretical in
nature” (e.g., it would be unduly expensive or otherwise burdensome) or
because it would not actually achieve the stated objective (as held in EC–
Asbestos).175
Brazil–Tyres in 2007 restated the “necessary to” analysis as composed of
two steps.176 After the proponent makes a prima facie case, a three-part test
analyzes (1) the “relative importance” of the interests that the measures are
intended to protect, (2) the extent to which those means contribute to the
stated ends, and (3) the measure’s restrictive impact on international
commerce.177
China–Audiovisuals is a more recent WTO case from 2009 in which the
Chinese unsuccessfully attempted to apply the “public morals” exception,
and it is of particular relevance here because it analyzed the “necessary to”
question in light of the language of the “public morals” exception from
GATT Article XX(a).178 In that case, the U.S. alleged that China restricted
the rights of both Chinese and foreign enterprises with respect to the
importation and distribution of a wide variety of publications and audiovisual products, in violation of the GATT, GATS, and two paragraphs of
China’s WTO Accession Protocol.179 China did not appeal a finding by the
Panel that some of these measures violated GATT Article III:4 and instead
attempted to justify the measure under the GATT Article XX(a) “public
morals” exception.180 In the end, however, the AB upheld the Panel’s
finding that China failed to demonstrate that the national treatment
violation was “necessary” to protect public morals and therefore the

175

Id.
Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶
178, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil–Tyres].
177
Dispute Settlement Commentary for Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 13, WT/DS332/AB/R (2007) [hereinafter
Commentary for Brazil–Tyres]).
178
Report of the Appellate Body, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products, ¶¶ 336-37, WT/DS383/AB/R, AB-2009-3 (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter
China–Audiovisuals].
179
Report of the Panel, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, II.A,
WT/DS383/R (Aug. 12, 2009) [hereinafter “Panel Report, China—Audiovisuals”];
United States Trade Representative, 2009 U.S.T.R. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S
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measure did not justify an exception under GATT Article XX(a).181
Two major focuses in China–Audiovisuals include whether the “public
morals” exception can apply to a claim arising from a source such as an
Accession Protocol, which is neither a part of the GATT nor the GATS
(which include analogous versions of the exception), and the appropriate
standard to apply to the “necessary to” language that appears in multiple of
the Article XX exceptions, including Article XX(a).182 The Panel and AB
in China–Audiovisuals were in agreement that the “public morals”
exception is available in Accession Protocol cases, but the reasoning
behind that decision was unclear, leaving room for future debate.183
The “necessary to” question was evaluated using the Brazil–Tyres threestep analysis described above, beginning with the question of whether there
is a “link between import entities, content, review, and the protection of
public morals”; i.e., an assessment of the relative importance of the moral
values at stake.184 The United States, however, conceded that the purpose
of China’s measures was to protect public morals and instead argued that
the measures were not “necessary” to protect those public morals per
Article XX(a).185
On the next question of the analysis, i.e., the question of whether the
means used by China materially contributed to protecting the moral values
asserted by China, the U.S. argued that China failed to show that the
prohibition related to its goal of preventing inappropriate material, that
allowing only a selective group of importers was not necessary for
adequate content review, and that the measures went a step too far by
calling for state ownership of import activities.186 The AB held that the
Panel did not err in agreeing with the United States on this point; however,
the AB clarified a perceived ambiguity in the Panel’s approach by
specifying that the party applying the exception must demonstrate an actual
(i.e., rather than merely apparent) contribution to protecting the moral value
in question.187
181

China–Audiovisuals, supra note 178, ¶ 415(d), (e).
Doyle, supra note 171, at 145-46 (explaining that while the public moral
exception is embodied in the GATT and GATS and not the Accession Protocol, such
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The third factor from the Brazil–Tyres analysis is a balancing of the
measure’s trade-restrictive impact on international commerce.188 Here, the
U.S. offered a less restrictive alternative that would still permit China to
review content before it passed through customs.189 The Panel agreed that
the U.S. proposal would be “significantly less restrictive” than China’s
intended approach without affording China inferior protection of public
morals, concluding therefore that China failed both the second and the third
parts of the Brazil–Tyres analysis and consequently lacked the justification
required to receive an exception for its trade measure under Article XX(a),
and the AB agreed with the Panel’s conclusion.190
C. GATT Article XX(b) – Protection of Human Life
The other exception under the General Exceptions Clause that might
justify a Member’s otherwise discriminatory trade measure is Article
XX(b), which provides an exception for measures “necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health.”191 Robert Howse commented in
2003 that various labor rights could plausibly be connected to human
health, if human health is interpreted broadly to include physical and
psychological well-being.192 Howse gave such examples as freedom of
association, recognition of collective bargaining rights, and elimination of
employment and occupational discrimination, noting that “[t]he other
issues concerning whether the EU measures fit under Article XX(b) are
quite similar to those that exist for Article XX(a).”193 Under this reading,
and given that it uses the same “necessary to . . .” condition, Article XX(b)
can be read as applying to the same variety of labor rights issues that would
apply under Article XX(a), and can be applied using the same formal
analysis as provided in the prior section for Article XX(a).
Prior to Shrimp-Turtle, scholars were uncertain as to whether Article
XX(b) could be applied in an outwardly-directed manner.194 Although the
Shrimp-Turtle holding concerned an application of Article XX(g), later
scholars viewed the “dynamic” standard articulated in the case as formally
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permitting outwardly-directed measures under Article XX(b).195 That may
be too generous a reading of Shrimp-Turtle, which utilized an
environmental application of Article XX(b), particularly because
environmental offenses (e.g., killing endangered sea turtles) have tangible
physical impacts traceable outside the borders of the offending country
(e.g., reduced presence of sea life in international waters), whereas it is
conceivably much more difficult to evidence harms caused outside a
Member’s borders (other than with respect to economic competitiveness)
arising from its domestic labor rights offenses. That is to say that, even if
Shrimp-Turtle allows for new interpretations of the General Exceptions
Clause not originally contemplated at the time of drafting, it is not
necessarily the case that this extends to outwardly-directed measures; and
even if it can apply to some outwardly-directed measures, Shrimp-Turtle
itself describes a circumstance that is at least in some modicum inwardlyfacing, whereas a measure to require better labor standards abroad seems
(at least in many cases) to be entirely outwardly-facing and therefore might
be distinguished by the WTO as different from the circumstances of
Shrimp-Turtle.
A more recent case addressing the application of Article XX(b), albeit
for a clearly inward-facing measure, is EC–Asbestos. In that case, the
French Government imposed a ban on chrysotile asbestos, which was
known to be harmful to human health despite its use in some industrial
applications.196 The Panel found that the measure violated GATT Article
III:4.197 Nonetheless, the Panel followed the approach of US–Gasoline to
195
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find that the measure was (1) necessary insofar as the EC made “a prima
facie case for the non-existence of a reasonably available alternative to the
banning of [asbestos] products,” that the measure was (2) not on its face
arbitrary or unjustifiable, (3) nor a “disguised restriction” on international
trade per the conditions provided in U.S.–Gasoline.198 Consequently, the
panel concluded that Article XX(b) provided an exception for the violation
of Article III:4.199 On appeal, the AB affirmed the Panel’s ruling despite
reversing some of its findings on legal grounds.200
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether a trade measure can, under the WTO Most Favored Nation and
National Treatment rules, treat otherwise identical goods differently
because one good is made under poor labor conditions and the other is
made under labor conditions deemed acceptable by the international
community depends largely upon whether the two goods will be considered
“like” products under GATT Articles I or III.201 If the standard is that
products merely need to be competing or substitute goods to be “like”
products, it seems that they would not be distinguishable as other than
“like” if the sole difference between the products is their respective
processes of manufacture and if the production and process methods used
do not relate to the final product (i.e., on the sole grounds of npr-PPMs).
Although this view was affirmed in the un-adopted US–Tuna report, EC–
Asbestos and US–Superfund appeared to leave the door open to the
possibility that npr-PPMs can be relevant to a likeness determination;
however, it is unclear whether, at a minimum, some trace amount of
process-related input must be physically present in the final product.202
Looking at Japan–Alcohol, the AB corrected the Panel regarding the
relevance of evidence that Japan’s disputed measure isolated Japan’s
domestic product from foreign competition, emphasizing that this
evidenced protectionism in violation of the WTO rules.203 Korea–Beef and
EC–Biotech Products subsequently reaffirmed this focus on protectionism
both domestic and imported products, Article III must apply.” Panel Report, EC–
Asbestos, supra note 196, ¶ 8.90. The Panel emphasized that, at the time of France’s
decree banning asbestos, France was itself a producer of asbestos and, therefore, the
measure “applies to an imported product and to the like domestic product” per Note at
Article III. Id. at ¶ 8.91. After finding the similar asbestos products in question were
like, the Panel concluded that the ban violated GATT Article III:4. Id. ¶ 8.158.
198
Id. ¶¶ 8.222, 8.229 & 8.235-8.240.
199
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200
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as the overriding concern at the core of the likeness analysis when it put
forward the principle of “no less favorable treatment,” which excuses
differential treatment even where there is an economically competitive
relationship between the products in question, so long as the treatment is no
less favorable to the foreign imports than to the competing domestic
product.204
Looking broadly at the jurisprudence, Howse and Regan assert that the
competitive relationship between two products is only instrumentally
relevant in determining the main issue, which is whether the measure in
question amounts to protectionism.205 This approach gets away from the
product/process distinction, leaving open the possibility that a permissible
trade measure may be founded primarily on process grounds (e.g.,
differences in applicable labor standards). Under this approach, it may be
easiest for a Member to justify its actions as non-protectionist if the
approach used is universal (i.e., what constitutes a reasonable standard for
minimum wage may vary considerably from one country context to
another, whereas the same ban on child labor or slavery could be equally
appropriate in any country context). Other approaches to creating a WTOcompliant labor-rights-focused trade measure include trying to introduce
commonly agreed-upon labor standards, such as the ILO standards, through
the TBT Agreement, and using the subsidies, dumping, and countervailing
duties rules of the WTO to justify countervailing duties where a Member’s
failure to enforce its own labor-related standards amount to a subsidy
equivalent to a financial contribution by the government.
But assuming that a labor-supporting trade measure is deemed
discriminatory under one of the other Articles of the GATT, the Article XX
General Exceptions Clause may in specific instances excuse and allow
what would otherwise be a violation. GATT Article XX(e) provides a
straightforward exception for trade measures targeting products of prison
labor. The other two exceptions that may be applicable in the labor rights
context are Articles XX(a) and XX(b); however, their scope is prima facie
vague and must be understood in light of the various cases that interpret
them.
U.S.–Gambling was the first case that interpreted the “public morals”
standard, not through Article XX(a) but instead through an analogous
provision in the GATS.206 That case showed that the facial test for the
“necessary to” standard does not require either that the party defending the
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measure tried to negotiate with the other party to devise a more mutually
acceptable alternative or that the complaining party came to the dispute
proposing a less restrictive alternative to the measure in question.207 The
other cases interpreting the “necessary to” standard applied the same
approach, regardless of whether the measure fell under XX(a), (b), (d), all
of which use the same “necessary to . . .” language as the GATS section
referenced in US–Gambling.208 After US–Gambling, Brazil–Tyres provided
an important three part test later applied in China–Audiovisuals, the first
case to directly analyze the application of GATT Article XX(a) (i.e., rather
than its GATS analog).209 There, the U.S. conceded the first step and the
AB held that China failed to meet the other two parts of the test, and
therefore failed to justify its measure under Article XX(a).210 Whereas the
earlier EC–Asbestos case held that the measure must at a minimum be
potentially able to accomplish the moral objective in question in order to
make the prima facie case, China–Audiovisuals went a step farther by
holding that the party defending the measure must ultimately show an
actual (rather than merely a perceived) contribution to that goal.211 China–
Audiovisuals also confirmed that demonstration of a reasonable alternative
measure that meets the moral objective of the measure in question through
substantially less trade-restrictive means is evidence that the measure is not
in fact “necessary.”212
For a labor rights measure in particular, an important question remains
whether the measure can be “outwardly facing,” i.e., apply to the public
morals of countries other than the one advancing the trade measure under
dispute. In this regard, the ability to demonstrate the universality of those
morals may be a deciding issue. To that end, international treaties, e.g., the
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work or the
International Bill of Human Rights, may be instrumental in evidencing
universal acceptance of some set of public morals concerning labor rights.
In addressing the human and labor rights problems that persist in
international trade, some commentators argue that the best way to improve
international labor rights standards is to look for possibilities within the
rules of the World Trade Organization, including the addition of explicit
exceptions allowing trade measures intended to promote labor rights.213
These commentators argue that, unlike other international institutions like
207
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the ILO or UN, the WTO has strong enforcement mechanisms.214 It is
worth noting, however, that dissenting critics argue that linking labor
standards and trade “is like spreading peanut butter on your steak” and can
even produce destructive results.215 These critics believe that labor rights
issues should be left to the ILO and other organizations designed for the
purpose of promoting those issues.216 In the meantime, as future WTO
decisions clarify the scope of application of Article XX(a) and Article
XX(b) in the context of discriminatory trade measures justified on labor
rights grounds, it will become more apparent whether the WTO is a forum
that is appropriate for, and capable of, enforcing labor rights standards.
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